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The Attorney-Client Privilege After Attorney Disclosure 
Courts have long espoused the principle that the right to waive 
the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and not to his attor-
ney.1 But clients beware. In a variety of circumstances, courts have 
held that a lawyer may waive2 the attorney-client privilege even 
without the client's knowledge. Some courts have held that a law-
yer's inadvertent out-of-court disclosure of privileged communica-
tions3 destroys the privilege.4 Others have found waiver where a 
lawyer intentionally discloses his privileged communications with 
l. See, e.g., Esposito v. United States, 436 F.2d 603,606 (9th Cir. 1970); Republic Gear Co. 
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967); Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381, 396 (8th 
Cir. 1892); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
2. The effect of a waiver may differ according to the context in which it occurs. When 
courts find that an out-of-court disclosure of a privileged co=unication "waives" the privi-
lege, they clearly mean that the content Qf the disclosure is no longer barred from production, 
see, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973), or admission 
at trial, see, e.g., Holland v. State, 17 Ala. App. 503, 86 So. 118 (1920), on privilege grounds. 
The previous disclosure may enable opposing attorneys to "compel"· the client to testify con-
cerning the disclosed communication in the sense that the client may no longer assert the 
privilege to avoid answering their questions. See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 
74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (dictum); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 
(1971). The circumstances in which courts will allow the opposing party to examine the attor-
ney are not well-settled. Generally, where the client has infringed the attorney's honor 
through allegations of improper or inept behavior, the attorney may testify to refute those 
allegations. See, e.g., People v. Ottenstror, 127 Cal. App. 2d 104,273 P.2d 289 (1954); Grant v. 
Harrison, 116 Va. 642, 82 S.E. 718 (1914); cf. Seeger v. Odell, 64 Cal. App. 2d 397, 148 P.2d 
901, 906 (1944) (both client and attorney involved in fraudulent transaction). It is unclear, 
however, when an attorney may be compelled to testify regarding co=unications which were 
privileged when made, but were later disclosed. One judge's co=ents in a case in which a 
lawyer was compelled to testify against a former client regarding such co=unications illus-
trate the problem: 
Least of all should the courts seize upon slight and equivocal circumstances as a technical 
reason for destroying the privilege. Here the attorney was compelled to testify against his 
client under threat of punishment for contempt. Such procedure would have been justi-
fied only in case the defendant with knowledge of his rights had waived the privilege in 
open court or by his statements and conduct had furnished explicit and convincing evi-
dence that he did not understand, desire or expect that his statements to his attorney 
would be kept in confidence. Defendant's attorney should have chosen to go to jail and 
take his chances of release by a higher court. This is not intended as a criticism of the 
action of the attorney. It is, however, a suggestion to any and all attorneys who may have 
the misfortune to be confronted by the same or a similar problem. 
People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 447, 277 P.2d 94, 101 (1954) (Shinn, J., concurring). 
An attorney has an ethical duty to maintain the confidences of his client. See ABA CODE 
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4 (1978). This Note does·not discuss when an at-
torney's disclosure constitutes a violation of this ethical duty. 
3. This Note will not examine the criteria for finding a co=unication privileged. For a 
case setting forth these criteria, see United States Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. 
Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2292 (McNaughton rev. 
ed. 1961 & Supp. 1979). The circuits are split over when co=unication to counsel made by 
agents ofa corporation are privileged. Compare United States v. The Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 
1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980) (adopting a "control group" test) with 
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en bane) (adopting a "sub-
stantial responsibility" test). This Note assumes that the communications disclosed would sat-
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the client in pursuit of the client's cause.5 Still others have found 
waiver where, during the trial, a lawyer introduces or fails to object 
to the introduction of such communications. 6 In all of these cases, 
the courts have offered no meaningful rationale for creating excep-
tions to the rule that the attorney-client privilege cannot be waived 
without the client's consent. At the same time, courts obeying the 
"client consent rule" have failed to recognize that some circum-
stances may warrant exceptions. To properly determine when an at-
torney's disclosure waives the client's privilege, courts should 
recognize and balance the interests that weigh for and against find-
ing waiver. 
This Note examines the interests that must be balanced in deter-
mining when an attorney's disclosure7 waives the attorney-client 
privilege. Part I presents three judicial standards defining the class 
of attorney disclosures that waive the privilege: the traditional client 
consent rule that only attorney disclosures to which the client has 
consented constitute waiver;8 the broader "implied authority" view 
that attorney disclo'sures made with the client's consent or with an 
intent to further the client's cause constitute waiver;9 and the still 
more expansive view that all attorney disclosures falling within the 
scope of the attorney's agency authority to act for the client waive 
the privilege.10 Part II examines how the primary purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege - to encourage full and free communica-
tion between attorney and client - is promoted by upholding the 
privilege even after an attorney's disclosure without his client's con-
sent.11 Part III turns to two other societal interests - judicial effi-
ciency and fairness to opposing parties - that adherence to the 
isfy the requirement for a valid claim of attorney-client privilege were it not for the finding of 
waiver. 
4. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 
(D.D.C. 1970). 
5. See, e.g., Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. 111, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963), 
6. See, e.g., United States v. King, 484 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 904 
(1974); Jones v. Marble Co., 137 N.C. 185, 49 S.E. 94 (1904). 
7. This Note examines only the effect of attorney disclosures that occur during the exist-
ence of the attorney-client relationship. 
8. See, e.g., Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381 (8th Cir. 1892); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); Scheuer v. Scheuer, 239 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Southern R.R. 
v. White, 108 Ga. 201, 33 S.E. 952 (1899); Mileski v. Locker, 14 Misc. 2d 252, 178 N.Y.S.2d 911 
(Sup. Ct. 1958). 
9. See, e.g., Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. i 11, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963), 
10. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert, 
denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979). 
11. See, e.g., Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381 (8th Cir. 1892); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes 
Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 345 A.2d 
830 (1975); In re Reuter, 6 Misc. 2d 411, 163 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct.), '!lfd., 4 A.D.2d 252, 164 
N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1957). 
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client consent rule may impair, and balances these interests against 
that of free communication in the context of in-court and out-of-
court attorney disclosures. It concludes that for attorney disclosures 
made out of court, neither fairness nor judicial efficiency provide 
sufficient reason to deviate from the client consent rule. For attorney 
disclosures made in court, however, Part III concludes that a court 
could find that fairness and judicial efficiency justify holding the 
privilege waived. 
l. THREE STANDARDS OF ATTORNEY W AIYER 
A. Consent 
The privilege against compelled disclosure of confidential com-
munications between lawyer and client dates at least as far back as 
the reign of Elizabeth I in the late sixteenth century. I2 Early courts 
viewed the privilege as protecting the attorney's honor; the client had 
no right to claim or to waive the privilege. I3 Near the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, courts adopted the theory that the privilege 
exists to protect the client rather than the attomey. I4 As courts 
adopted this new theory, they also formulated a new rule of waiver: 
the client alone could waive the privilege. Is Courts apparently be-
lieved that clients needed protection from non-compelledI6 attorney 
disclosures as well as from legally compelled attorney disclosures. 17 
After the modem view of the attorney-client privilege developed, 
numerous courts held that a client must consent to his attorney's dis-
closure before it can constitute waiver of the privilege. Is In these 
courts' view, a client's consent to disclosure of privileged communi-
cations indicates that the client no longer relies on the privilege's 
promise of secrecy, and therefore, that the privilege no longer pro-
motes free communication between the client and the attomey. I9 
12. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at§ 2290. 
13. See, e.g., Winchester v. Fournier, 2 Ves. Sr. 445 (1753). 
14. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at § 2290. 
15. [The client] should be able to place unrestricted and unbounded confidence in the 
professional agent, and . . . the co=unications he so makes to hinI should be kept se-
cret, unless with his consent (for it is his privilege, and not the privilege of the confidential 
agent), that he should be enabled properly to conduct his litigation. 
Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, 2 Ch. D. 644,649 (1876), quoted in J. WIGMORE, supra 
note 3, § 2291 at 547. 
16. ''Non-compelled" disclosures for the purposes of this Note include both voluntary and 
accidental disclosures by the attorney. 
17. See, e.g., Jones v. Marble Co., 137 N.C. 237, 49 S.E. 94 (1904); Craig, Lessee of Annes-
ley v. Richard, Earl of Anglesea, 17 T. Howell, State Trials 1139, 1241 (1943) (Recorder, argu-
ing for the privilege), quoted in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2291 at 545-46. 
18. See note 8 supra. The client's consent may sometimes be inferred from the circum-
stances. See Hi=elfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 1949). 
19. This same reasoning underlies the rule that the client's disclosure of the co=unica-
tion to a third party constitutes waiver, see In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 867 (1973), and the rule that the privilege never attaches unless the client takes rea-
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Holding the privilege waived thereafter serves society's interest in 
having complete evidence presented in court. Other courts, however, 
have held that an attorney's voluntary disclosure waives the privilege 
even without the client's consent.20 Attorneys have this expanded 
power to waive the privilege under the "implied authority" and 
"agency authority" standards. 
B. Implied Authority 
Some courts hold that an attorney's intentional disclosure with-
out the client's consent waives the attorney-client privilege if the at-
torney believed the disclosure would advance the client's cause.21 In 
Sprader v. Mueller, 22 for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that an attorney's disclosure of privileged communications 
waived the privilege even though the client had not consented to the 
disclosure. Mrs. Sprader had made a statement to her attorney that 
conflicted with her later testimony at trial. Her attorney disclosed 
the statement to a county prosecutor in order to spare her from an 
interview and in exchange for information the prosecutor controlled. 
In a subsequent civil suit, the opposing attorney sought to introduce 
the inconsistent disclosed statement, arguing that the disclosure 
waived any privilege. The trial court held the communication inad-
sonable precautions to prevent third parties from overhearing the communication. See 
Schwartz v. Wenger, 267 Minn. 40, 124 N.W.2d 489 (1963). In all of these situations, disclo-
sure of the co=unication to the third party makes it unnecessary to compel the client or the 
attorney to disclose the content of the co=unication and holding the privilege attached to the 
communication waived does not chill future attorney-client communications. But the first ef-
fect alone does not provide a satisfactory theory for waiver of the privilege. Requiring only 
that the disclosure be non-compelled would mean that bad faith attorney disclosures should 
waive the privilege, but see Scheller v. Scheller, 239 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); that 
erroneous court rulings compelling disclosure should also waive it, but see Transamerica Com-
puter Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978); and that stolen attorney-client communi-
cations should also constitute waiver. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley 
& Co., 466 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1979). 
20. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 
(D.D.C. 1970); Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. 111, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963). 
21. See Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Sprader v. 
Mueller, 265 Minn. II I, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963). Wigmore argued that implied authority 
should cover "all disclosures (oral or written) voluntarily made to the opposing party or to 
third persons in the course of negotiations for settlement or in the course of taking adverse 
steps in the litigation ... when necessary in the opinion of the attorney." 8 J. WJOMORE, 
supra note 3, at § 2325. Any other voluntary disclosure by the attorney without the consent of 
the client, Wigmore said, should not constitute waiver. Wigmore's statement that the attorney 
must believe the disclosure "necessary" for there to be implied authority suggests that he 
thought the exception should cover only the attorney's intentional disclosure and not those 
caused by inadvertence. However, Wigmore also explicitly argued that "involuntary" disclo-
sure (presumably Wigmore meant inadvertent rather than legally compelled) by the attorney 
should also waive the privilege. Id. 
For a discussion of attorney-client privilege problems surrounding exchange of informa-
tion among attorneys representing clients with a co=unity of interest, see Note, Waiver of 
Attorney-Client Privilege on Inter-Attorney Exchange of Ieformation, 63 YALE L.J. 1030 (1954). 
22. 265 Minn. Ill, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963). 
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missible. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that 
because an attorney has the implied authority to disclose privileged 
information to further the client's cause, the disclosure waived the 
privilege.23 
In many cases where the attorney believes disclosure advances 
the client's cause, clients would probably not object to disclosure if 
consulted at the time. In these cases, holding the privilege waived 
seems consistent with the policy underlying the consent rule:24 a cli-
ent's fortuitous ignorance should not preserve the privilege where the 
client would have consented to disclosure had he been consulted. 
But this reasoning ignores the frequent failure of attorneys to realize 
that their disclosures may constitute waiver. The consent rule pro-
tects clients from this lack of c:are by their attorneys. The consent 
rule also protects clients who would have objected to disclosure had 
they been consulted by their attorneys. The implied authority stan-
dard therefore subverts the policy underlying the client consent rule. 
C. Agency Authority 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has embraced 
an even more expansive standard for attorney waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege. In In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean 
Transportation,25 the Circuit held that a client's grant of agency au-
23. 265 Minn. at 117, 127 N.W. 2d at 180: 
In modem practice pretrial discovery has resulted in the routine exchange of informa-
tion on a voluntary basis to obviate the expense of taking formal depositions. We believe 
that within limits which do not offend our sense of professional propriety (however elusive 
this definition of the rule may prove to be), an attorney has the right to use privileged 
matter for legitimate bargaining purposes. In so doing, he may waive the privilege with-
out committing any breach of his ethical obligation to respect his client's confidences. 
24. One court justified waiver in a case with facts similar to Sprader on a theory of "im-
plied consent." In Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971), the 
plaintiff's attorney disclosed to a police officer the plaintiff's confidential statements concerning 
the cause of a car accident in order to attempt to prevent the filing of criminal charges against 
his client. The court held that consent could be inferred because the disclosures were made for 
the plaintiff's benefit and were reasonably necessary to protect him from criminal liability. 
Because it found the privilege waived by the disclosure, the court held the plaintiff could be 
questioned about his statements in a subsequent personal injury action. 
25. 604 F.2d 672, 675, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979). 
Ocean Transportation arose out of a grand jury investigation begun by the Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division into ocean freight transportation. In August of 1976, defendant Sea-
Land Services received subpoenas duces tecum requiring the production of specified docu-
ments. In response, Sea-Land instructed its attorneys to produce all documents not covered by 
the attorney-client privilege. The attorneys marked the privileged documents with a "P," but 
then mistakenly delivered them along with the non-privileged documents to the Justice De-
partment. The Justice Department noticed the marks and, thinking counsel might have erred, 
asked them whether they intended to produce all the documents. Sea-Land's attorneys told 
them they had and that they claimed no privilege. 
In March of 1977, the attorneys realized they had delivered privileged documents the pre-
vious September. They met with Government attorneys to explain the blunder, but did not 
formally request the documents' return. They did not disclose the gaffe to Sea-Land until 
December of 1977. When Sea-Land learned of the accidental delivery, it fired the attorneys 
and obtained new counsel. The new counsel formally requested the return of the documents, 
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thority to an attorney justifies charging the client with a non-com-
pelled attorney disclosure. In the Ocean Transportation case, 
attorneys defending a target of a federal grand jury investigation ac-
cidently delivered privileged documents to the government that the 
defendant had instructed counsel to withhold. The appellate court 
affirmed the district court's ruling26 that the disclosure destroyed the 
attorney-client privilege, stating: 
To be sure in the final analysis, the privilege is for the client, not the 
attorney, to assert .... Original counsel, however, acted as [the cli-
ent's] agent in determining which documents would be produced pur-
suant to the subpoena and which documents would be withheld under 
the attorney-client privilege. Original counsel acted within the scope 
of the authority conferred upon it, and [the client] may not now be 
heard to complain about how that authority was exercised.27 
but while negotiations were pending, the Government sought to question a Sea-Land em-
ployee about them before the grand jury. The employee asserted the attorney-client privilege. 
604 F.2d at 674-75. 
26. The district court published no opinion explaining its ruling that the disclosure waived 
the privilege. After the court of appeals found that the privilege underlying the disclosed doc-
uments had been waived, the district court rejected a government argument that the disclosure 
waived the privilege as to the subject maller of the disclosed documents. See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings Investigation of Ocean Transp., (1980-1] TRADE CAs. 77,938 (D.D.C. 1980). See 
note 42 i,!fra for a discussion of subject matter waiver after non-compelled attorney disclosure. 
21. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert, de-
nied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979). 
Ocean Transportation is the first federal appellate court case holding that breach of the 
attorney-client privilege by an attorney's accidental disclosure results in a waiver. The first 
case to suggest a rationale to support this result was United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 
15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954). The case involved a company that had allowed Justice 
Department officials access to its files, failing to realize they contained documents protected by 
the attorney-client privilege. The government attempted to use copies of the privileged docu-
ments against Kelsey-Hayes. The court held that the disclosure destroyed the privilege, 
Though this result was consistent with previous cases, the rationale was not. The court held 
the privilege waived not because of the client's voluntary disclosure, but rather on the rationale 
that the policy underlying the privilege could no longer be served once the communication's 
confidentiality was breached: 
[E]ven though the privilege may once have attached, that does not mean that the subject 
matter of the communication is forever immune from being used as evidence. The cloak 
of confidence may be lifted by subsequent events, with or without the concurrence of the 
party claiming the privilege. . . . 
[A]fter the first publication the communication is no longer confidential and there is no 
reason for recognizing the privilege. 
15 F.R.D. at 464. 
A later case, Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 
(D.D.C. 1970), adopted the Kelsey-Hayes rationale. Pursuant to a consent order, the plaintiff 
had turned over certain documents to its attorney, who, without examining the documents, 
delivered them to the opposing attorneys. After realizing that some of the materials were 
privileged, the attorney attempted to exclude the documents. The court, however, held the 
privilege waived, finding that the breach of confidentiality destroyed "the basis for the contin-
ued existence of the privilege." 314 F. Supp. at 549. 
In other cases involving inadvertent disclosures, some courts have relied upon the reason-
ing of Kelsey-Hayes and Underwater Storage, focusing on the breach of confidentiality rather 
than the client's consent to, or participation in, the disclosure. See, e.g., Ranney-Brown Dis-
trib., Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3 (S.D. Ohio 1977). The reasoning of Kelsey-
Hayes and Underwater Storage was expressly rejected, however, in Dunn Chem. Co. v. 
Sybron Corp., (1975-2] TRADE CAs. 67,458 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court held that the acciden-
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This agency theory would make virtually every attorney disclosure 
during the time the client retains counsel a waiver of the privilege.28 
Even disclosures caused by theft of privileged communications from 
an attorney's office might constitute waiver under this theory.29 
To justify its agency authority standard for attorney waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege, the D.C. Circuit asserted that once the con-
fidentiality of privileged communications is breached, the client no 
longer reasonably values the privilege. 30 The court also claimed that 
upholding the privilege after disclosure would be unfair to opposing 
counsel.31 This Note challenges both of these assertions: Part II ar-
tal production of privileged documents during discovery did not waive the privilege, despite 
the breach of confidentiality. The court deemed it "important to look beyond the 'objective 
fact of production,' which the Underwater Storage case did not." [1975-2] TRADE CAs. at 
67,463. "What is important is an intention of confidentiality - the intention of the client." 
[1975-2] TRADE CAS. at 67,463. 
28. It is not clear how the decision would affect the rule barring waiver where an attorney 
intentionally discloses in violation of the client's known intent to withhold. For a case which 
adopted that rule, see Scheller v. Scheller, 239 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); cf. Liggett 
v. Glenn, 51 F. 381 (8th Cir. 1892) (disclosure by attorney not made in pursuance of client's 
interest so that privilege was not waived). The Ocean Transportation court suggested that it 
was because the attorney's disclosure appeared intentional that it felt the privilege should be 
waived: 
Perhaps this latter rule should not be strictly applied to all cases of unknown or inadver-
tent disclosure; this, however, is not a case where any such exception is appropriate. Here, 
the disclosure cannot be viewed as having been inadvertent in all respects. Original coun-
sel knew that some papers marked "P" had been divulged. This production was brought 
to their attention on at least one occasion; each time, however, said counsel declined to 
assert the privilege. 
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 915 (1979). 
29. The Ocean Transportation court stated that the risk of theft of documents from the 
attorney's possession falls upon the client. Wigmore expresses this as a normative rule, see 8 J. 
W!GMORE, supra note 3, at§ 2328, however, his conclusion was based on an assumption which 
itself seems unwise. He argued that the risk that third parties might overhear the communica-
tions should always fall upon the client, and therefore that the client should also bear the risk 
of theft by third persons from the attorney. For a case that apparently adopts Wigmore's rule 
concerning eavesdroppers, see Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Comm., 164 
N.Y.S.2d 9, 143 N.E.2d 772, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957) (communication with the attor-
ney overheard through "bugging" device - the court stated the privilege was thereby waived). 
For cogent commentary criticizing the Lanza decision, see Comment, J)ue Process and the 
Allorney-Client Privilege, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (1957); Note, Allorney-C/ient Privilege Not 
Violated by Playing Recording ef Consultation at Legislative Hearing, 36 TEXAS L. REV. 505 
(1958). One court has expressly rejected Wigmore's normative rule concerning stolen privi-
leged documents, finding it inconsistent with modem authority. See In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979). 
30. The Government attorneys' minds cannot be expunged, the grand jury is familiar 
with the documents, and various witnesses' testimony regarding the papers has been 
heard. This is not a case of mere inadvertence where the breach of confidentiality can be 
easily remedied. Here, the disclosure cannot be cured simply by a return of the docu-
ments. The privilege has been permanently destroyed. 
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 915 (1979). 
31. Most importantly, it would be unfair and unrealistic now to permit the privilege's 
assertion as to these documents which have been thoroughly examined and used by the 
Government for several years. 
604 F.2d at 675. 
934 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:927 
gues that clients often have good reason to value the privi~ege even 
after attorney disclosure, while Part III concludes that fairness con-
cerns, even when considered along with the judicial efficiency alleg-
edly promoted by an expansive waiver standard, do not warrant 
finding waiver because of an out-of-court attorney disclosure. 
II. THE CASE FOR THE CLIENT CONSENT STANDARD 
The attorney-client privilege encourages each client to disclose 
all the relevant facts surrounding his legal problems to his attor-
ney. 32 Full disclosure enables the attorney to base his actions and 
advice on an accurate understanding of the facts; in short, it enables 
him to better represent his client's interest. The privilege encourages 
full communication between attorney and client because it frees cli-
ents from the fear that what they tell the attorney will be later used 
against them.33 To this end, neither the attorney nor the client may 
be compelled under sanction of law to disclose the content of their 
privileged communications until the privilege has been waived.34 
Even when a judge unwittingly requires disclosure of privileged 
communications, that disclosure does not destroy the privilege.35 
Just as protecting clients from compelled attorney disclosures en-
courages free communication with attorneys, protecting clients from 
unauthorized, non-compelled disclosures by attorneys may have the 
same effect. This conclusion follows from three observations. First, 
contrary to the D.C. Circuit's claim in Ocean Transportation, clients 
have good reason to value the privilege even after disclosure by the 
attorney. Second, traditional remedies available to a client whose 
attorney has disclosed privileged information without permission are 
inadequate substitutes for preservation of the privilege after attorney 
disclosure. Finally, if an expansive attorney waiver standard is 
. adopted, some clients will recognize both the diminished scope of the 
privilege and the greater risks accompanying unauthorized attorney 
32. Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me. 368, 373, 32 A. 975, 976 (1895): 
While the right of every person to conduct his own litigation should be scrupulously 
respected, he should not be discouraged, but rather encouraged, in early seeking the 
assistance or advice of a good lawyer upon any question of legal right. In order that the 
lawyer may properly perform his important function, he should be fully informed of all 
facts possibly bearing upon the question. The person consulting a lawyer should be en-
couraged to co=unicate all such facts, without fear that his statements may possibly be 
used against him. 
33. See, e.g., Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381, 397 (8th Cir. 1892); United States v. Kelsey-
Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 134-
35, 345 A.2d 830, 837-38 (1975); In re Reuter, 6 Misc. 2d 411, 413, 163 N.Y.S.2d 576, 580-81 
(Sup. Ct.), qjfd, 4 A.D.2d 252, 164 N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1957), 
34. People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 277 P.2d 94 (1954). 
35. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(inadvertent production of certain documents in accelerated discovery proceedings did not 
waive the privilege because the production was, in effect, compelled). 
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disclosures, and are therefore more likely to withhold information 
from their attorneys. 
The first observation, that clients value the privilege even after 
unauthorized attorney disclosure, seems almost undeniable. The cli-
ent wishes to prevent disclosure because he values both maintaining 
confidentiality and keeping the communication out of court. Once a 
disclosure occurs, the value of confidentiality is reduced. On this ba-
sis, some courts have concluded that the client no longer values the 
privilege after disclosure.36 But these courts have ignored the value 
to the client of keeping the information out of court. The preserva-
tion of the privilege may be invaluable if an opposing party seeks to 
introduce the disclosed communication as evidence at trial.37 In 
such a situation, the standard for waiver determines whether the 
privilege can be asserted at trial to exclude the communication. 
A client arguably will not value preservation of the privilege very 
highly where an attorney discloses a document (or other real evi-
dence) not in itself privileged, but obtained through a confidential 
communication from the client. In such a situation, even if the privi-
lege is preserved and the fact of communication remains inadmissi-
ble, opposing attorneys can nevertheless introduce the disclosed 
document. Communications that are not privileged from production 
in the hands of the client do not become privileged when transferred 
to the attorney.38 After the disclosure, protecting the fact of commu-
nication to the attorney might be of small value since the document 
is subject to an order for production and is admissible at trial. 
Where the attorney discloses a privileged communication itself, 
however, the client may value the preservation of the privilege quite 
highly. Often there will be no way for the opposing party to intro-
duce the substance of the communication without also proving the 
fact of communication. In this situation, if the privilege is pre-
served, the opposing parties cannot introduce that evidence. If the 
court holds that the disclosure waived the privilege, the opposing 
parties could introduce the communication itself to establish the con-
tent of the communication. 39 
36. E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 
(E.D. Mich. 1954). 
37. See, e.g., Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. ll I, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963). 
38. See, e.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953). 
39. Dodging the hearsay bar might be a problem in some cases, however. Where the cli-
ent's attorney orally disclosed a communication, opposing parties might have a difficult time 
finding a hole through which to introduce the testimony of the party to whom the attorney 
disclosed, in order to establish the attorney's statements. Courts are prone to finding excep-
tions to the hearsay rule where "convenient," however. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 17 Ala. 
App. 503, 86 So. I 18 (1920) (where the client disclosed privileged communications, hearsay 
held no bar to testimony concerning the client's statements). Where the attorney discloses a 
privileged written communication from the client, the hearsay bar would not exist. The oppos-
ing party would need to authenticate the communication - establishing that the client was the 
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The difference between these two situations is best illustrated 
through examples. Assume that a client charged with robbing a 
bank delivers a privileged communication - a letter - to his de-
fense attorney, and that in the letter the client admits that he com-
mitted the robbery and explains that he has buried the money 
nearby. Suppose that after reading the note, the lawyer accidently 
drops it on the street while returning to his office. A passerby picks it 
up, reads it, and delivers it to the prosecutor. Unless the privilege is 
waived by this inadvertent disclosure, the prosecutor cannot intro-
duce the letter at trial. Although the disclosed information would 
provide leads to other incriminating evidence, the client would value 
having the privilege preserved. 
Assume that the same defendant had written the same note to his 
mother and later recovered it from her and delivered it to the attor-
ney. Again, assume that the note accidentally reaches the hands of 
_the prosecutor. The note itself is not privileged since it was not writ-
ten in reliance on the privilege's promise of secrecy.40 Even if the 
privilege continued after the disclosure, so that the opposing attorney 
could not introduce communications between client and attorney 
into evidence, the privilege would not bar introduction of the note.41 
Preservation of the privilege in this situation would therefore benefit 
the client less than if the communication itself were privileged. 
Yet even where the attorney discloses a document not in itself 
privileged, preservation of the privilege may promote the client's in-
terest. For example, waiver of the privilege would enable opposing 
counsel to prove that a client delivered a possibly incriminating doc-
ument to his attorney. From that fact of delivery, a jury might infer 
that the client knew the document was incriminating and was there-
fore attempting to conceal it. Similarly, a jury might draw inferences 
unfavorable to the client merely because the damaging document 
was held in secrecy. 
Clients might also value the privilege even after disclosure of a 
non-privileged document because courts often do not limit waiver to 
the information actually disclosed, and digested by the third party.42 
By compelling production of privileged documents that were dis-
closed to a third party but are no longer within that party's knowl-
edge or possession, a court often provides a source of evidence not 
otherwise available to the opposing party. Often courts rationalize 
declarant - and introduce it as an admission by a party opponent. For a codified definition of 
an admission by party opponent, see FED. R. Evm. 80I(d)(2). 
40. See, e.g., Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913); Palantini v. Sarian, 15 N.J. 
Sup. 34, 83 A.2d 24 (1951). 
41. The note would not be barred from introduction under the rules of evidence. See note 
39 supra. 
42. See, eg., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1976); 
Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970). 
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this result on the ground that any waiver should waive the privilege 
with respect to the entire subject of the disclosure.43 All these pos-
sibilities indicate that, whether or not the disclosed document was 
privileged, a client may reasonably value the secrecy of his commu-
nications concerning the document even after the document is dis-
closed. 
Showing that the client has good reason to value the privilege 
even after attorney disclosure is not alone sufficient to justify the cli-
ent consent rule for attorney waiver. If clients had adequate reme-
dies for noncompelled attorney disclosures, waiver of the privilege 
after disclosure would not necessarily chill free communication be-
tween client and attorney. But the remedies available to a client 
whose attorney has disclosed privileged communications are far 
from adequate. A client confronted by an unauthorized attorney 
disclosure could either bring a private suit for damages against the 
attorney44 or encourage a bar association to investigate the attorney's. 
43. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1976); 
Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970) (in 
both cases it was enough to warrant subject matter waiver that the disclosure was "voluntary"). 
The rule that the waiver extends beyond the content of the disclosure contents to its subject 
matter developed because of the unfairness in allowing clients to selectively introduce privi-
leged information. If the waiver extended only to the disclosure's contents, the client could 
disclose favorable information and withhold unfavorable information on the same subject. 
This would be unfair since "the privilege of secret consultation is intended only as an inciden-
tal means of defense and not as an independent means of attack, and to use it in the latter 
character is to abandon it in the former." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2327, at 638. 
The rule has commonly been applied when the client offers his or his attorney's testimony 
at trial. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 521 (1957). The rule has not been limited, however, to 
disclosures at trial. See, e.g., Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). Anytime a disclo-
sure is intentional, there is a strong probability that the client is being selective as to the infor-
mation he discloses. The probability would seem extremely high where the client knows that 
the disclosures might be exposed in court and his liability thereby affected. Nevertheless, 
where it is clear that the client has not sought to distort facts by disclosing only favorable 
.information, the rule against partial waiver should not apply. 
Some courts have recognized that finding the disclosure ''voluntary" is not sufficient to 
justify a subject matter waiver. In Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. 
Ill. 1976), a client at a pretrial deposition had voluntarily disclosed part of a privileged conver-
sation. The court found that the disclosure was not intended to reveal only favorable informa-
tion, since it was of limited scope in response to the specific questions posed by the opposing 
attorneys. Thus, the court held the waiver applied oQ.ly to the specific contents of the disclo-
sure. It considered that such a ruling would "promote the fairness which the partial disclosure 
qualification is designed to encourage while serving the compelling public policy considera-
tions underlying the attorney-client privilege." 412 F. Supp. at 289. See also In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings Investigation of Ocean Transp., [1980-1] Trade Cas. 77,938 (D.D.C. 1980). 
Several courts have held that a voluntary disclosure of privileged documents to a govern-
mental agency during a non-public agency investigation does not waive the privilege for pur-
poses of a separate proceeding initiated by private plaintiffs. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. 
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). Contra, In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
44. See, e.g., Lakoff v. Lionel Corp., 207 Misc. 319, 137 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sup. Ct. 1955); 
Taylor v. Blacklow, 3 Bing. N.C. 235 (1836). 
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breach of his ethical duty not to disclose privileged information.45 
Private damage suits inadequately remedy the injury caused by 
attorney disclosure for a number of reasons. First, it is doubtful that 
all attorney disclosures that injure a client constitute breaches of the 
attorney's duty to exercise reasonable care in managing the client's 
affairs.46 Second, the amount of damages caused by the disclosure 
may be difficult to prove.47 Finally, money damages arguably offer 
inadequate compensation in criminal cases where the attorney's dis-
closure has cost the client his freedom. Similarly, sanctions imposed 
by courts to discipline attorneys do not replace the losses of the cli-
ent. The inadequacy of both of these remedies is suggested by their 
failure to deter many non-compelled attorney disclosures.48 
Clients reasonably value the attorney-client privilege after attor-
ney disclosure; available remedies for attorney disclosure do little to 
replace that value if lost. All that remains in justifying the client 
consent rule is to show that some clients will recognize these two 
truths, and will therefore communicate less freely with their attor-
neys if a more expansive attorney waiver rule is adopted. This step 
in the argument must be taken more gingerly, for although it seems 
clear that protecting clients from legally compelled disclosures en-
courages clients to communicate freely with their attorneys, it is not 
clear that protecting clients from attorneys' non-compelled disclo-
sures produces the same effect. First, attorneys usually try to avoid 
disclosing damaging information except where some offsetting bene-
fit will result from the disclosure. Thus, fewer clients will hear of 
non-compelled disclosures of privileged information, and fewer will 
rely on the preservation of the privilege after disclosure in deciding 
45. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4 (1974). See, e.g., United 
States v. Costen, 38 F. 24 (D. Colo. 1889). 
46. Clients rarely sue their attorneys for unauthorized disclosure of privileged communica-
tions. This evidences the substantial deterrents to the bringing of such suits. The rare cases 
where the client has sued involved intentional attorney disclosures made with the purpose of 
betraying the client's interest. See, e.g., Lakoffv. Lionel Corp., 207 Misc. 319, 137 N.Y.S.2d 
806 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Taylor v. Blacklow, 3 Bing. N.C. 235 (1836). Although most deliberate, 
non-compelled attorney disclosures will necessarily constitute breaches of the attorney's duty 
to exercise reasonable care in managing his client's affairs, in a case like Sprader v. Mueller, 
265 Minn. 111, 127 N.W.2d 176, (1963), where an attorney discloses with the client's interest in 
mind, a court might find that the action was not negligent as a matter of law. 
47. In order to recover damages against the attorney for the loss of or failure to win a case 
because of the attorney's negligence, the client generally bears the difficult burden of demon-
strating that, but for the negligence complained of, the client would have been successful in the 
prosecution or defense of the action. See, e.g., Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 8 
Cal. Rptr. 32 (1960). 
48. E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979): Ranney-Brown Distrib., Inc. v. E. T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 
F.R.D. 3 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp., 1975-2 TRADE CAs. 67,458 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 
(D.D.C. 1970); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, No. 61-C-147(2) (E.D. Mo. Mar. 
20, 1963); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United 
States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954). 
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how much to tell their attorneys. Second, even among those clients 
who know of the protections against an attorney's non-compelled 
disclosures, some probably are not induced to disclose anything to a 
lawyer that they would not disclose without the protections. A client 
who does not trust his lawyer's loyalty or care in handling privileged 
information will likely distrust his lawyer generally, and might take 
his legal business elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, some clients will not fully trust the lawyers they 
retain, and will also know whether an attorney's disclosure waives 
their privilege. A rule preventing waiver when attorneys make un-
authorized disclosures will encourage these clients to communicate 
sensitive information they would otherwise withhold. While the 
number of clients so induced to share more information may be 
small, the total amount of evidence withheld from the trier of fact 
when the rule is followed is also small.49 But promoting communi-
cation does entail other costs; in addition to reducing the amount of 
evidence available to the trier of fact,50 the client consent rule may 
impose hardships on both opposing parties and the judicial system. 
The next part of this Note examines those hardships, and concludes 
that they vary substantially depending on whether or not the disclo-
sure occurs during a court proceeding. 
III. THE COSTS OF THE CLIENT CONSENT STANDARD 
The dilemma of when an attorney disclosure should waive the 
attorney-client privilege involves a choice between costly alterna-
tives. Courts faced with unauthorized attorney disclosures can either 
hold the attorney-client privilege waived, thereby sacrificing the free 
communication promoted by the client consent standard, or they can 
uphold the privilege and take measures to protect it after disclosure. 
The costs of protective measures may include reduced judicial effi-
ciency and unfairness to opposing parties. The magnitude of these 
49. The evidence that would qualify for admission but for the client consent rule includes 
communications that come into the hands of the opposing attorneys because of the attorney's 
non-compelled disclosures not made in bad faith to the client's cause, and the inferences that 
one could rationally draw from such communications. The consent rule does not prevent the 
introduction of evidence obtained from the disclosure where introduction does not require 
proof of ~e communication itself. 
A direct relationship exists between the number of attorney disclosures of privileged infor-
mation and the degree to which the client consent rule encourages attorney-client communica-
tions; the more often such disclosures occur, the more likely that clients will know of them and 
the greater the likelihood that they will rely on the rule's protection in disclosing information 
to their attorney. 
SO. Part Ill of the Note balances society's interest in fairness and judicial efficiency against 
the net benefit society otherwise realizes from the client consent standard. The Note assumes 
that the cost of lost evidence remains important in determining the proper waiver rule; how-
ever, Part III does not discuss that cost explicitly simply because the very existence of the 
underlying privilege indicates that the society has elected to sacrifice evidence in order to en-
courage attorney-client communication. 
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costs will vary with the protective measures taken, and these in turn 
vary considerably depending upon whether the unauthorized disclo-
sure occurs in or out of court. In choosing between waiver and pro-
tective measures, courts should balance the cost of abandoning the 
client consent standard against the costs of feasible protective mea-
sures. 
A. Costs of Protecting the Privilege After Out-of-Court .Disclosure 
Although a court can order a variety of measures to protect the 
attorney-client privilege after an out-of-court51 disclosure,52 the least 
costly alternative will usually be to hold that the specific information 
disclosed is inadmissible as evidence. While a broader exclusionary 
rule might more adequately remedy the injury inflicted by the disclo-
sure, fully counteracting the effects of disclosure is not feasible. 
Once opposing attorneys acquire information from a disclosure, it is 
difficult to prevent them from following the trail toward other evi-
dence that the information suggests.53 Furthermore, courts would 
, usually have great_ difficulty even tracing an attorney's steps from 
disclosed information to other evidence. Courts would also have 
trouble determining whether the opposing attorneys would not have 
discovered the evidence but for the disclosure. Because of these diffi-
culties, it would be impractical for the court to exclude any evidence 
other than the specific information disclosed. Yet even this narrow 
exclusionary rule arguably causes some unfairness to opposing par-
ties and some judicial inefficiency. 
Any unfairness opposing parties might suffer from this method of 
adherence to the client consent rule depends upon their reasonable 
reliance on the admissibility of the disclosed communication. If op-
posing attorneys think the disclosed communication is favorable and 
admissible, they may not search as diligently for other evidence. Ad-
ditionally, they may plan the order and manner of presenting their 
evidence on the assumption that the communication is admissible. If 
a court then rules the communication inadmissible at trial, opposing 
parties would have to restructure their trial presentation, and that 
task would be difficult unless the ruling came very early in the trial. 
They might also have to initiate a search for other evidence, a search 
51. An "out-of-court" disclosure is one that occurs outside the knowledge of the trier of 
fact. An in-court disclosure is one in which the content of the confidential communication is 
disclosed to the trier of fact. Thus some disclosures that occur in the courtroom or during the 
court proceeding should nevertheless be considered out-of-court disclosures. 
52. For example, if an attorney has disclosed documents privileged in themselves, the court 
could order the return of the documents and any copies. This would limit the damage from 
the disclosure, especially where the opposing attorneys possessed the documents for only a 
short period of time. 
53. Attorneys are not precluded from introducing evidence discovered through leads given 
by disclosure of privileged information, see C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LA w OF 
EVIDENCE § 89, at 184-85 (Cleary ed. 1972). 
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that would probably not bear fruit during the trial unless the court 
grants a continuance. 
These potential hardships do not weigh against the client consent 
rule, however, because opposing attorneys cannot reasonably rely on 
the admissibility of privileged communications disclosed by an attor-
ney. 54 Many courts still adhere to the client consent rule,55 and op-
posing parties who obtain privileged information should recognize 
the risk that the information is inadmissible because the client has 
not consented to the disclosure. If all courts adhered to the client 
consent rule, opposing attorneys would have no reason to rely on the 
admissibility of disclosed attorney-client communications unless 
they verified the client's consenno the disclosure. Adherence to the 
client consent rule therefore causes little unfairness to opposing par-
ties when the unauthorized attorney disclosure occurs outside the 
courtroom.56 
Excluding the specific information yielded in an unauthorized 
out-of-court disclosure may slightly reduce judicial efficiency. Prov-
ing client consent before introduction of disclosed communications 
may require some additional court time. 57 The opposing attorney 
may also consume more court time trying to prove the subject matter 
of the communication through separate evidence if he is unable to 
prove the consent required before introduction of the disclosed com-
munication itself. But since most attorneys present all favorable evi-
dence in any event, little time would be saved by finding waiver. 
Additionally, when the client has not consented to the disclosure, 
adherence to the client consent rule saves the time required to intro-
duce the disclosed information. 
On the other hand, holding that unauthorized attorney disclo-
sures waive the privilege may waste judicial resources by increasing 
the number of cases that go to court. The consent rule keeps cases 
54. Of course, it may go too far to say that the opposing attorneys could never reasonably 
rely on the admissibility of disclosed information. For example, where an attorney constructs 
an elaborate fraud to convince the opposing attorneys that the client has consented to the 
disclosure when, in fact, the client has not, it might indeed unfairly prejudice the opposing 
party not to hold the privilege waived. 
55. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
56. This analysis assumes that the opposing attorney has reason to suspect the evidence is 
privileged. Conceivably, in rare cases, the opposing attorneys would have no reason to suspect 
the evidence is privileged. For example, the contents of the note lost by the bank robber might 
contain the client's signature, but might not suggest that it was written to the client's attorney. 
The question of unfair prejudice, however, turns on the opposing attorney's reasonable reli-
ance that the evidence is admissible. And where so little is known about evidence that the 
opposing attorney does not suspect its privileged nature, reliance on its admissibility is unrea-
sonable. 
57. The burden of proving that a co=unication is privileged and that the privilege has 
not been waived falls upon the party asserting the privilege. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 
{2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & 
Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 870 (D. Minn. 1979). 
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that could not be maintained without the disclosed information out 
of court.58 Furthermore, if disclosures waive the privilege, attorneys 
may be less willing to make disclosures that lead to settlements.59 
And if clients withhold information due to an expanded waiver rule, 
attorneys may overestimate the strength of their clients' cases, and 
therefore settle less readily. For these reasons, neither judicial effi-
ciency nor fairness to opposing parties justifies holding that an attor-
ney's unauthorized out-of-court disclosures waive the attorney-client 
privilege. 
B. Costs of Protecting the Privilege After .Disclosure in Court 
When attorneys disclose privileged communications during a 
court proceeding,60 excluding the specific information disclosed is no 
longer a viable means of protecting the privilege. The jury has al-
ready heard the information, and excluding it as evidence would do 
little to repair the damage caused by that breach of the privilege. 
Instead, the court can choose between the protective measures of de-
claring a mistrial and instructing the jury not to consider the dis-
closed information. This Note argues first that declaring a mistrial is 
rarely appropriate, and second that the costs of a corrective instruc-
tion may outweigh the costs of finding waiver, depending upon how 
the disclosure occurred. 
In court, an attorney may breach his client's privilege in two 
ways: he himself may introduce privileged communications,61 or he 
may fail to object when opposing counsel introduces previously dis-
closed privileged information.62 In either event, the disclosure will 
very rarely63 justify a new trial. The opposing party and the court 
should rarely bear the expense and delay of a second trial which the 
58. Wigmore argued that protecting attorney-client communications by encouraging the 
client to fully disclose the facts to the attorney may reduce the amount oflitigation based upon 
unfounded claims. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at§ 2291. Some commentators have 
criticized this argument on the ground that, should a client discover from one attorney that 
certain facts may harm his case, he may go to another attorney and withhold those facts. See, 
e.g., Radin, The Privilege of Co,ifidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. 
L. REV. 487, 490 {1928). 
59. Congress considered society's interest in promoting settlements strong enough to war-
rant excluding from evidence statements made during settlement negotiations. See FED. R. 
Evro.408. 
60. This discussion assumes that the disclosure was within the presence and knowledge of 
the trier of fact. See note 51 supra. While the text assumes that the trier is a jury, the same 
analysis should apply where the trier is the judge. However, the need for declaring a mistrial 
may be reduced to the extent that judges are better able than juries to ignore inadmissible 
evidence that is erroneously introduced. 
61. See, e.g., Jones v. Marble Co., 137 N.C. 185, 49 S.E. 94 (1904). 
62. See, e.g., United States v. King, 484 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
904 (1974). 
63. One of the rare exceptions to this rule might be where an opposing attorney introduces 
extremely prejudicial privileged communications that he has stolen from the other attorney's 
office. 
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attorney could have avoided by properly respecting his client's privi-
lege. Both judicial efficiency and fairness to the opposing party 
weigh against declaring a mistrial when privileged information is 
disclosed in court. 64 
The appropriateness of protecting the privilege through a cura-
tive instruction depends upon how the breach of the privilege oc-
curred in court. Where an attorney breaches his client's privilege at 
trial by himself introducing privileged communications, fairness to 
the opposing party probably justifies holding that the disclosure 
waives the privilege.65 Here the court could properly be concerned 
that the attorney has only disclosed favorable information. In such a 
case, a curative instruction would be an insufficient response. Be-
cause the disclosure of favorable information still may influence the 
jury, attorneys would often introduce favorable privileged informa-
tion and then assert the privilege before the opposing attorneys could 
bring out unfavorable features of the communication. Thus, if a 
court did no more than issue a curative instruction to the jury, 
prejudice to the opposing party might result. Fairness requires that 
the opposite side have an opportunity to rebut the presumably 
favorable information disclosed. Because this concern appears to 
outweigh the slight chilling effect on attorney-client communication 
that may result from :finding waiver in such a narrow class of cases, 
the court should hold that this type of in-court disclosure waives the 
privilege as to the subject matter of the disclosure. 
A curative instruction may be a more appropriate protective 
measure when an attorney fails to- make a timely objection to the 
introduction of privileged communications by the opposing party. 
Here there is little danger that the disclosed information will favor 
the client holding the privilege. Although the attorney might wait to 
assert the privilege until the opposing attorney begins presenting in-
formation unfavorable to the client, the opposing attorney can guard 
against any prejudice by introducing the unfavorable part of the 
communication first. 
Where the disclosure of unfavorable privileged information oc-
curs before the attorney can objeet, the court should not hold the 
privilege waived. 66 But where the attorney simply fails to make a 
64. This is not true where the trial court erroneously holds the privilege waived. See, e.g., 
Transamerica Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978). That is equivalent 
to a compelled disclosure. To permit compelled disclosures would completely destroy the en-
couragement of attorney-client co=unications that the privilege was designed to achieve. 
Clients know that, in each individual case, courts have a strong interest in exposing confiden-
tial co=unications. 
65. See, e.g., Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. 
Mich. 1966). 
66. The court should instruct the jury to disregard the "blurted out" disclosure by the 
opposing attorney or the witness. In cases where the disclosed information is highly damaging 
to the client and the judge concludes that a corrective instruction will not prevent the informa-
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timely objection, waiver of the privilege might be appropriate. A 
failure to make a timely objection usually waives the right to ob-
ject.67 A number of courts have held that an attorney who fails to 
object to the introduction of privileged information may not assert 
the privilege on appeal.68 Where the attorney makes a late objection 
at the trial, a curative instruction might partially remedy the effects 
of the disclosure already made, but it would also decrease the attor-
ney's incentive to make a timely objection. While the correct bal-
ance is unclear, a court could justify holding that failure to make a 
timely objection waives the privilege by finding that judicial effi-
ciency outweighs any chilling effect caused by waiver. In sum, when 
unauthorized attorney disclosures occur during court proceedings, 
the costs of protecting the attorney-client privilege, whether by new 
trial or by curative instruction, may often outweigh the benefits of 
the client consent rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The attorney-client privilege encourages full communication be-
tween attorneys and clients by allaying the client's fear of later ad-
verse use of statements made to the attorney. The privilege exists for 
the client's benefit, and most courts have therefore held that an attor-
ney's disclosure without the client's consent does not waive the privi-
lege. Courts that deviate from this "client consent" standard of 
attorney waiver, whether on implied authority or agency authority 
theories, have failed to realize that this waiver standard, like the un-
derlying privilege, promotes full communication between attorney 
and client. A more expansive attorney waiver standard would chill 
full communication by some clients who would recognize both the 
value of the privilege after disclosure and the inadequacy of reme-
dies for unauthorized attorney disclosures. 
The costs of the client consent standard for attorney waiver vary 
depending upon the measures used to protect the privilege after dis-
closure. When the unauthorized attorney disclosure occurs outside 
the courtroom, excluding the specific information disclosed from ad-
mission at trial seems an appropriate protective measure. On careful 
examination, this measure causes little unf aimess to opposing parties 
and little reduction of judicial efficiency. When unauthorized attor-
tion from altering the jury's decision, the judge could declare a mistrial. This result would 
serve the policy underlying the privilege. Substantial costs in terms of lost court time and 
additional effort and expense to the opposing party would accrue, but notions of fairness 
strongly favor the holder of the privilege; neither the client nor the attorney representing the 
client are responsible for the disclosure before the jury. The case is similar to that in which a 
court unwittingly compels disclosure where no waiver has occurred. 
67. FED. R. Evm. l03(a)(l) and Advisory Committee Note. 
68. United States v. King, 484 F.2d 924 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 904 (1974); 
United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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ney disclosures occur in the courtroom, however, feasible protective 
measures become considerably more costly. The costs of declaring a 
mistrial or delivering a curative instruction may outweigh the bene-
fits of the client consent standard in such circumstances, and holding 
the privilege waived may be appropriate. 
In any event, absent legislation, courts must decide which stan-
dard of attorney waiver to apply. Their decisions should hinge upon 
a careful consideration of both the costs and the benefits of protect-
ing the attorney-client privilege after attorney disclosure. 
